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cided that the word "surviving" referred to the testator's death, then,
because Claire and Oliver survived the testator, their children would
share with Dudley in the corpus of the trust set up for Marie Louise.
It could be argued that this construction of the will would prevent
Dudley's share from passing by intestacy to Charles Gautier, who was
expressly excluded by the will.26 Courts very frequently try to avoid
a construction that will lead to intestacy.27 The added fact that Charles
Gautier might inherit some of the testator's property upon Dudley's
death could have deterred the court from construing the remainder
as contingent upon survival of the life beneficiary. The answer given
by the court to this argument was that "a court may not rewrite the
will in order to avoid intestacy." 28
The problem presented in the principal case could have been
avoided by careful draftsmanship. Explicit language as to what period
of time survivorship is referred would eliminate needless litigation
over a matter that should have been handled previously by the drafts-
man. There could have been no dispute in the Gautier case had the
will provided as follows:
".... and in the event that the nephew or niece dies leaving no
children the share shall be divided equally among his or her
brothers and sisters who are living at the death of such nephew
or niece."
The New York Court of Appeals has adopted a rule of construction
which makes words of survivorship referable to the death of the life
tenant rather than the death of the testator. Whether the rule of
Moore v. Lyons still prevails in New York remains to be determined by
future decision. It is submitted that Moore v. Lyons will still be applied
in similar cases.
MERRILL C. TRADER
A DEFENDANT'S APPEARANCE AS EVIDENCE OF HIS AGE
Whether in a judicial proceeding the triers of fact may "use their
eyes as well as their ears"1 to fix one's age presents a more perplexing
2Charles Gautier was a nephew of the testator, but not a son of the primary life
beneficiary, Clara.
2zIn re Carney's Estate, 171 Ind. 379, 86 N.E. 400 (19o8); In re Vance's Estate,
209 Pa. 561, 58 Ad. io63 (19o4).
2146 N.E.2d at 774.
1
State v. Gebhardt, 219 Mo. 7o8, 119 S.W. 35o, 852 (19o9), quoting from Garvin
v. State, 52 Miss. 209 (1876).
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problem than would appear at first blush. It is a question fairly well
settled in the United States, 2 but yet one which has arisen recently in
Indiana in near-unique form. Watson v. State3 has posed the question:
May an age determination be founded solely on a nontestifying de-
fendant's physical appearance?
Watson was convicted of armed robbery, a crime explicitly requir-
ing the perpetrator to be more than sixteen years of age.4 No evidence,
however, was directed to that point by the state, nor did the defendant
take the witness stand to testify. The court instructed the jury that
proving defendant to be "over sixteen years of age"'5 was a necessary
element of the state's case, but that his appearance as observed in
court would substantiate a finding on the question.6 The jury returned
a verdict of guilty and a finding that Watson was "38 years of age."7
On appeal Watson argued two grounds of error: (i) the verdict was not
'For cases affirmatively allowing the trier of fact to utilize physical appearance
in fixing age, see United States ex rel. Fong On v. Day, 54 F.2d 99o (2d Cir. 1932);
Wong Fook Ngoey v. Nagle, 3oo Fed. 323 (gth Cir. 1924); Williams v. State, 98 Ala.
52, 13 So. 333 (1893); Dutzler v. State, 41 Ariz. 436, 19 P.2d 326 (1933); People v.
Elgar, 39 Cal. App. 78, 178 Pac. 168 (1918); Slocum v. People, 12o Colo. 86, 207
P.2d 970 (1949); Quinn v. People, 51 Colo. 350, 117 Pac. 996 (1911); Slaughter v.
District of Columbia, 134 A.2d 338 (D.C. Munic. App. 1957); Cunningham v. United
States, 86 A.2d 918 (D.C. Munic. App. 1952); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Bean, 49 Ga. App.
4, 174 S.E. 209 (1934); State v. Scroggs, 123 Iowa 649, 96 N.W. 723 (1903); State v. Do-
rathy, 132 Me. 291, 17o At. 506 (1934); Commonwealth v. Hollis, 17o Mass. 433, 49
N.E. 632 (1898); Commonwealth v. Phillips, 162 Mass. 504, 39 N.E. 1o9 (1895); People
v. Elco, 131 Mich. 519, 91 N.W. 755 (1902); State v. Davis, 237 Mo. 237, 140 S.W. 902
(1911); State v. Gebhardt, 219 Mo. 708, 119 S.W. 350 (1909); State v. Thompson, 155
Mo. 300, 55 S.W. 1013 (1;oo); Waterman v. Waterman, 42 Misc. 195, 85 N.Y. Supp.
377 (Sup. Ct., App. T. 19o3); Garbarsky v. Simkin, 36 Misc. 195, 73 N.Y. Supp. 199
(Sup. Ct., App. T. 19oi); State v McNair, 93 N.C. (Davidson) *628 (1885); State v.
Arnold, 35 N.C. (Ire.) *184 (1851); Schnoor v. Meinecke, 77 N.D. 96, 40 N.W.2d
803 (195o); Stiles v. State, 39 Okla. Crim. 142, 264 Pac. 226 (1928); Hunter v. State,
6 Okla. Grim. 446, 119 Pac. 445 (1911); Commonwealth v. Emery, 51 Pa. Super. 55
(19i"); Shephard v. Smith, x98 Wash. 395, 88 P.2d 6oi (1939); State v. Fries, 246
Wis. 521, 17 N.W.2d 578 (1945).
But see People v. Rogers, 415 Ill. 343, 114 N.E.2d 398 (1953); Wistrand v. People,
-13 Ill. 72, 72 N.E. 748 (19o4); McGuire v. State, 4 Tex. Civ. App. 386, 15 S.W.
917 (1891).
314o N.E.2d 1o9 (Ind. 1957). Contra, State v. Dorathy, 132 Me. 291, 17o At. 506
(1934), the only case aside from the principal one having answered this specific
question.
'Ind. Ann. Stat. § 10-4709 (1956).
qIbid.
6"Mou are further instructed that you may observe the defendant and draw
upon your observation of him in determining whether or not the defendant was
a person over sixteen years of age at the time of the commission of the alleged
offense." 14o N.E.2d at iio.
714o N.E.2d at iio.
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sustained by sufficient evidence, and (2) the court's instruction was im-
proper.
In a 3-2 decision the Supreme Court of Indiana accepted defen-
dant's argument that admission of such evidence would effect a vital
loss of control by the trial court. "A jury looking about the court
room, seeing objects brought into the court room, has no right to
consider such extrinsic material, and base their verdict thereon ....
The same rule holds true as to persons within the view of the jury
during the trial."8 In basing their decision upon this line of reasoning,
the majority accepted several fundamental assumptions.9 It was the
assumption by the majority that evidence need be specifically directed
at the question of age to raise a "reasonable inference"'10 thereof that
motivated the dissenting opinion. The minority contended that when
defendant was described by a witness as a "man," the inference must
be obvious. Moreover, when defendant was described as drinking beer
in a tavern, the minority was willing to take judicial notice of the
statute which made this unlawful for a "person under the age of 21
years.""' In short, the minority found sufficient evidence in the record
to raise a "reasonable inference" as to Watson's age.
81d. at 112.
The court clearly assumes the basic concept that physical appearance is ad-
missible evidence in fixing a person's age. In accepting this principle the court was
not persuaded by previous Indiana cases to the contrary. See Bird v. State, 1o4 Ind.
384, 3 N.E. 827 (1885); Robinius v. State, 63 Ind. 235 (1878); Ihinger v. State, 53
Ind. 251 (1876); Stephenson v. State, 28 Ind. 272 (1867). The older cases rested upon
the ground that evidence nonreviewable by an appellate court is inadmissible.
Moreover, the court casually assumed age to be an element of the case to be
proven by the state. This may be questioned. The Indiana statute, Ind. Ann. Stat.
§ 9-32o4(2) (1956), fixes eighteen years as the maximum age embracing delinquent
children and also defines a delinquent child as one under the age of eighteen who has
committed what for an adult would be a crime not punishable by death or life
imprisonment. Futhermore, the burden is on the defendant to prove himself within
the junevile age requirements-not upon the state to prove that he is not. Annot.,
48 A.L.R.2d 663, 700 (1956). Indiana has for some reason fixed a minimum age
requirement in the particular felony of armed robbery. Absent that provision, it
would seem that an offender under the age of eighteen would be a juvenile offender,
amenable only to the juvenile courts. It is arguable that the Indiana Legislature has
in this particular crime merely reduced the age requisite for adult responsibility by
two years-from eighteen to sixteen. If this be so, it would appear that the burden
of proof must still rest upon the defendant to show that he should fall under the
juvenile code.
"°14o N.E.2d at 113 (dissenting opinion).
"Ind. Ann. Stat. § 12-610 (1956). The majority specifically states that the doc-
trine of judicial notice could not be invoked here. This statement is unexplained,
but in State v. Dorathy, 132 Me. 291, 17o At. 5o6 (1934); State v. Gebhardt, 219 Mo.
708, 119 S.W. 350 (19o9); and State v. Fries, 246 Wis. 521, 17 N.W.2d 578 (1945),
the courts, under similar circumstances, applied judicial notice when the question of
age arose.
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It is clear that acceptance of the minority view would have ob-
viated a decision on the appearance problem.12 It is less clear why
the majority strained so to avoid the obvious sufficiency of evidence in
the record itself.13 In every other jurisdiction which has been faced
with such clear inferences as to age the decision has been that rea-
sonable inferences may arise from indirect evidence as well as from
evidence directed specifically to the point.14 But even if the court's cau-
tious scrutiny of the record be accepted, its reasoning as to the admissi-
bility of appearance has something less than a firm foundation. The
court justifiably balks at jurors' seeking their own evidence, but "ex-
trinsic material"' 5 brought into the court room seems hardly analogous
to a person required by statute to be continuously present throughout
the trial.16 State v. Dorathy'7 appears to be the only case on all fours
with the principal case.' 8 Therein the court held that the defendant
must "present himself before court and jury, to secure acquittal. This
he may do voluntarily, but whether voluntarily as a witness, or by force
of his compelled attendance, as here, he inevitably reveals that he is
a person, a male perhaps. He reveals his race, color, and, we hold,
somewhat as to his age."' 9 This reasoning has been accepted expressly
or impliedly in slightly distinguishable cases in other jurisdictions.
20
Though Watson represents a liberalizing of previous Indiana rulings,
uI.e., the sufficiency of the evidence of record would have made even an er-
roneous admission of appearance nonprejudicial.
n3"Are we to say that when a person it [sic] designated as a 'man' or 'woman'
that is evidence they are over sixteen years of age and when designated by a witness
as a 'boy' or a 'girl' it is presumed they are under sixteen years of age?" 14o N.E.2d
at 112. What could be a more reasonable inference than to expect a "man" to be
more than sixteen years old? This need not require the corollary inference that a
"boy" be less than sixteen.
"4State v. Gebhardt, 219 Mo. 708, 119 S.W. 350 (1909); State v. Thompson, 155
Mo. 300, 55 S.W. 1o 3 (1900); Commonwealth v. Emery, 51 Pa. Super. 55 (1912);
State v. Fries, 246 Wis. 521, 17 N.W.2d 578 (1945).
"514o N.E.2d at 112.
"Gind. Ann. Stat. § 9-18oi (1956).
1.132 Me. 291, 17o At. 506 (1934).
'-In neither case did the court find evidence of age in the record, nor did the
defendants take the witness stand. But each state did have a statute requiring
defendant's presence. Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-18o1 (1956); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. c. 148, §
14 0954).
"17o Ad. at 508.
2State v. Gebhardt, 219 Mo. 708, 119 S. W. 350 (1909); State v. Fries, 246 Wis.
521, 17 N.W.2d 578 (1945). In each the court found other evidence which was
weighed in conjunction with defendant's appearance. State v. Fries, supra, like State
v. Dorathy, supra note 17, stressed the absolute requirement of defendant's presence
in court in criminal cases. In all states accepting the general principle of ap-
pearance as admissible evidence, the question as to validity of observing a non-
testifying defendant has arisen in only four cases: State v. Dorathy, supra; State
v. Fries, supra; State v. Gebhardt, supra; and the principal case.
1958]
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it does not go to the extent reached in State v. Dorathy.21 It does not,
however, seem improbable that Indiana may someday accept the still
more liberal Dorathy view.
In determining to what extent the triers of fact may utilize physical
appearance in fixing a person's age, the cases, speaking generally, have
done so within the framework of a few significant factors-i.e., the ap-
pearance may or may not have been corroborated by direct evidence as
to age; and the person in question may or may not have taken the
stand as a witness. 22 Thus, it seems that closely related to the narrow
question put by Dorathy and Watson are several others arising from
combinations of the above factors. 23
Of these various possibilities, the greatest number of cases have
arisen where the appearance evidence was corroborated by other evi-
dence and the party also appeared as a witness. 24 The quantity is not
indicative of a highly contestible issue, however, for each case was
resolved in favor of admitting appearance when supported by other
evidence. None of these cases propound a clear line of reasoning as
to why appearance in conjunction with other evidence-as contrasted
with instances in which the appearance is unsupported by other
evidence-is admissible. 25 In fact, only one case, Garbarsky v. Simkin,20
"'See note 9 supra, citing previous Indiana cases held not persuasive by the
court in the Watson case.
=See Annot., 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 470 (1912).
WThe cases previously and hereafter cited represent an exhaustive research of
this subject by the writer. He has attempted to cite at least one representative case
from each jurisdiction deciding the right of the trier of fact (whether it be jury,
judge without jury, or a board of inquiry in a judicial proceeding) to weigh appear-
ance in determining age. This comment includes no cases which accept or reject
the admissibility of physical appearance based upon controlling statutes. Neither
does the comment contain any cases which rule upon the admissibility of a
witness' opinion, based on appearance, as to another's hge.
24Williams v. State, 98 Ala. 52, 13 So. 333 (1893); Dutzler v. State, 41 Ariz. 436, 19
P.2d 326 (1933); People v. Elgar, 39 Cal. App. 78, 178 Pac. 168 (1918); State v. Scroggs,
123 Iowa 649, 96 N.W. 723 (1903); Commonwealth v. Phillips, 162 Mass. 504, 39
N.E. 1o9 (1885); State v. Davis, 237 Mo. 237, 140 S.V. 902 (1911); State v. Thompson,
155 Mo. 300, 55 S.W. 1013 (19oo); People v. Elco, 131 Mich. 519, 91 N.W. 75 (1902);
People v. Lammes, 2o8 App. Div. 533, 203 N.Y. Supp. 736 (4th Dep't 1924) (dictum);
State v. McNair, 93 N.C. (Davidson) *628 (1885); Stiles v. State, 39 Okla. Grim. 142,
264 Pac. 226 (1928); Hunter v. State, 6 Okla. Crim. 446, 119 Pac. 445 (1911); Com-
monwealth v. Emery, 51 Pa. Super. 55 (1912). Accord, United States ex rel. Fong On
v. Day, 54 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1932); Wong Fook Ngoey v. Nagle, 3oo Fed. 323
(9th Cir. 1924); Waterman v. Waterman, 42 Misc. 195, 85 N.Y. Supp. 377 (Sup. Ct.,
App. T. 1903); Garbarsky v. Simkin, 36 Misc. 195, 73 N.Y. Supp. 199 (Sup. Ct., App.
T. 19o); Schnoor v. Meinecke, 77 N.D. 96, 4o N.W.2d 803 (195o).
Annot., 4o L.R.A. (N.s.) 470, 471 (1912).
'36 Misc. 195, 73 N.Y. Supp. 199, 200 (Sup. Ct., App. T. goi), upholding
admission of appearance with other evidence but specifically stating that it was
not to be implied that "the physical appearance of the defendants was alone suf-
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goes beyond its particular facts to point out in an unexplained dictum
that this contrast does exist. Frequently quoted in these decisions is
Professor Wigmore, who says, "Experience teaches us that corporal
appearances are approximately an index of the age of their bearer,
particularly for the marked extremes of old age and youth. In every
case such evidence should be accepted and weighed for what it may be
in each case worth. In particular, the outward physical appearance of
an alleged minor may be considered in judging of his age; a contrary
rule would for such an inference be pedantically over-cautious.
'27 It
should be noticed that Wigmore makes this observation in reference to
"every case." 2s Those cases citing this quotation from Wigmore as their
authority appear committed to follow the doctrine to the extreme-
to apply it in the absence of corroborating evidence even when the
party fails to appear as a witness. This passage was also cited in Watson,
but not applied to the extent Wigmore apparently intended.
Unfortunately, those cases wherein there is more evidence than
mere appearance, as to the age of a nontestifying defendant, do not
commit themselves by quoting Wigmore, nor do they go beyond bare
assertions of the jury's right to give weight to such inspections. 29 The
absence of either of these guides renders it highly uncertain whether
such courts would hold in accord with Dorathy or commit themselves
merely to the extent of Watson. The uncertainty arises because both
cases deal fundamentally with the question of jurors' seeking their
own evidence. Neither the presence nor absence of supporting evidence
would affect the court's view on what constitutes the jury's seeking
out its own evidence.
When a court has given weight to the uncorroborated appearance
of a person on the witness stand,3 0 the court's acceptance of a witness'
ficient" to substantiate a finding on age. And in People v. Lammes, 208 App. Div.
533, 2o3 N.Y. Supp. 736, 738 (4th Dep't 1924), the court stated: "Under the circum-
stances as disclosed by the evidence, an inspection of the complaining witness would
not aid the jury in determining her age .... The value of the inspection would have
been small as the question turned on a difference of 3o days in age, but see 2
Wigmore, Evidence § 222 (3d ed. 1940): "In every case such evidence should be ac-
cepted and weighed for what it may be in each case worth."
-2 Wigmore, Evidence § 222 (3d ed. 194o).
2sIbid. (Emphasis added.)
State v. Gebhardt, 219 Mo. 708, 119 S.W. 350 (199o); State v. Fries, 246 Wis.
521, 17 N.W.2d 578 (1945).
"Cunningham v. United States, 86 A.2d 918 (D.C. Munic. App. 1952); Slaughter
v. District of Columbia, 134 A.2d 338 (D.C. Munic. App. 1957) (a jury trial, specifi-
cally affirming Cunningham v. United States, supra, which was a trial by a judge);
Louisville & N.R.R. v. Bean, 49 Ga. App. 4, 174 S.E. 209 (1934); Commonwealth
v. Hollis, 170 Mass. 433, 49 N.E. 632 (1898); State v. Arnold, 35 N.C. (Ire.) *184
(1851); Shephard v. Smith, 198 Wash. 395, 88 P.2d 6oi (1939).
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appearance in conjunction with additional evidence would seem to
follow necessarily. However, a case following Wigmore3l is logically
committed to the extreme found in Dorathy and all intermediate
views.
One further line of cases needs to be examined. These cases inject
one factor correlative to all those mentioned before. The Colorado
court has continuously held that physical appearance is inadmissible
unless the jury is specifically notified that the person is being inspected
for that purpose.32 Whether such notification will cure the absence of
any other evidence, or whether the inspection must be coupled with
other evidence, remains uncertain from the language used.33 Notwith-
standing the qualification placed upon it, Colorado clearly accepts
the general principle that appearance can be admitted when properly
presented. Watson and People v. Lammes34 also accept this. In this
respect all previously cited cases agree.
This acceptance in principle is not unanimous throughout the
states. Texas and Illinois have specifically held otherwise. In Wistrand
v. People,35 the Illinois court contended that physical appearance as per-
sonally observed by the jury was not susceptible to appellate review.
Such evidence, the court held must therefore be admissible. The court
cited as support Stephenson v. State,36 which Watson effectually over-
ruled. The one Texas case, McGuire v. State,37 took the same line of
reasoning, citing two more Indiana cases38 which were also criticized
and disregarded by Watson. The fallacy of this reasoning must inhere
in all real evidence and stems from the fact that the bill of exceptions
purportedly contains all the evidence of a trial.3 9 Yet if a juror's per-
32 Wigmore, Evidence § 222 (3d ed. 1940).
nSlocum v. People, 12o Colo. 86, 207 P.2d 970 (1949); Quinn v. People, 51
Colo. 350, 117 Pac. 996 (1911).
j"[W]here no evidence has been offered upon the subject, and where the at-
tention of the jury has not been called to the appearance of the witness for that
purpose it is prejudicial error to accept the finding of a jury concerning the age
of the witness when it is material to conviction, with no evidence of any kind upon
the subject." Quinn v. People, 51 Colo. 350, 117 Pac. 996, 997 (1911). Does this mean
that where there is no other evidence, but where the jury's attention is directed to
the witness, it will not be prejudicial error?
'42o8 App. Div. 533, 2o3 N.Y. Supp. 736 (4th Dep't 1924). See note 26 supra.
3 213 Ill. 72, 72 N.E. 748 (19o4), recently followed in People v. Rogers, 415 I1.
343, 114 N.E.2d 398 (1953). But see People v. Grizzle, 381 Ill. 278, 44 N.E.2d 917
(1942), using different language but citing Wistrand v. People.
1128 Ind. 272 (1867). See note 9 supra.
"4 Tex. Civ. App. 386, 15 S.W. 917 (1891).
"Robinius v. State, 63 Ind. 235 (1878); Ihinger v. State, 53 Ind. 251 (1876). See note
9 supra.
"Wistrand v. People, 213 Ill. 72, 72 N.E. 748, 751 (1904); McGuire v. State, 4 Tex.
Civ. App. 386, 15 S.W. 917, g18 (1891). See 1 Thompson, Trials § goo (2d ed. 1918).
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sonal observations is evidence ipso facto, the bill of exceptions does
not contain all the evidence. Illinois and Texas resolve this paradox
by saying in effect that the observations of the triers of fact are not
evidence. To react thus, however, is to ignore that "it has been the
immemorial practice in criminal trials to exhibit to the jury burglars'
tools, blood stained clothing, and other indicia of crime. Although
the knowledge acquired by the jurors from such an inspection can
never be accurately conveyed to the minds of the appellate judges
through a bill of exceptions, would any court therefore fall into the
wild dream of holding that the jurors should be instructed to desregard
the evidence thus acquired?" 40 The answer is clearly no, and at the same
time no ready distinction presents itself as between the example and
the Wistrand doctrine. To contend that what a juror sees may not be
evidence, but only that which is described to him, would seem some-
what incongruous. Applying this as a rule of law may assure a criminal
a new trial under the most ludicrous of circumstances.41 If, on the
other hand, acceptance of the principle of personal inspection is
made, the court may within its own devices protect the innocent in
close cases. 42 It is unlikely that the Illinois court will influence other
jurisdictions in this matter.
That triers of fact may "use their eyes as well as their ears" appears
in retrospect quite substantially supported. Of the jurisdictions decid-
ing the question raised in this comment, the great majority have done
so affirmatively. 43 The others do not stand on firm ground.44 As be-
tween the majority jurisdictions, differences do exist, but at the same
time there subsists between them the salutary principle that to ignore
physical appearances would be "pedantically over-cautious." 45 This
principle, when properly applied, will aid the courts in sifting realistic
justice from the morass of technical procedure.
KINGSWOOD SPROTr, JR.
Ili Thompson, Trials § 90o (2d ed. ig8).
"Consider State v. Dorathy, 132 Me. 291, 17o Ad. 506 (1934). Dorathy was a 72
year old child-molester, but no formal proof was made of his age.
2People v. Lammes, 2o8 App. Div. 533, 2o3 N.Y. Supp. 736 (4th Dep't 1924),
is a good example of a court's protecting the person where the inspection might do
injustice. This is particularly incumbent upon all courts where the appearance
evidence is uncorroborated and where it is shown that under the particular circum-
stances the inspection could not establish a reasonable inference one way or the
other.
13See note 2 supra.
"See People v. Rogers, 415 Ill. 343, 114 N.E.2d 398 (1953); Wistrand v. People,
213 Ill. 72, 72 N.E. 748 (1904); McGuire v. State, 4 Tex. Civ. App. 386, 15 S.W. 917
(1891).
'-Vigmore, Evidence § 222 (3d ed. 194o).
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